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1999]
"STATUTORY NONDELEGATION": LEARNING
FROM FLORIDA'S RECENT EXPERIENCE
IN ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE REFORM

Jim Rossi*

I. INTRODUCTION
[T]o be blunt, the history of American administrative law
is a history of failed ideas.1
If Professor Mashaw's observation rings true at the federal

level, it might be said to hit us like a steamroller in the states. Most
state administrative procedure acts (APAs) are of a more recent
vintage than the Federal APA, which was adopted in 1946. Thus,
state APAs are more likely to reflect the fashion of the 1960s,
1970s, or 1980s than the time-tested ideas of their federal
counterpart. In addition, state APAs are much more detailed than
the Federal APA, making it more likely that not courts but state
legislatures-hardly known for their competence, let alone their
appreciation of administrative governance-are the source of new
ideas in administrative procedure. Also, state APAs are amended
far more frequently than the Federal APA. Florida's APA, for
example, has been amended almost every single year since its
adoption in 1974. None of this should come as a surprise. States,
after all, are laboratories of democracy and laboratories (like
democracies) produce failed experiments as well as successful ones.
In 1996 Florida adopted the most comprehensive set of changes

in the history of its APA. Florida's 1996 APA amendments grew
out of a reform effort that had been brewing for years, culminating
in

the appointment by then-Governor Lawton Chiles of a

Patricia A. Dore Associate Professor of State Administrative Procedure,
Florida State University College of law. Thanks to Scott Boyd, Natalie Futch,
Harold Krent, Ron Levin, and Joshua Sarnoff for their comments on draft.
1 JERRY L. MAsHAW, BUREAUCRATIC JUSTICE 1 (1983).
•
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fifteen-member APA Review Commission. Following several
months of deliberations, the APA Review Commission produced
proposals, which the Florida Legislature adopted with significant
amendments and which Governor Chiles signed into law in 1996.
These amendments were designed to simplify Florida's APA and to
promote accountability and flexibility in the administrative process. 2
Following adoption of Florida's 1996 APA reforms, I
expressed cautious skepticism, characterizing them as a rulemaking
11counter-revolution11:3 many provisions in the 1996 reforms pose a
tension with the Florida Legislature's traditional effort to favor
rulemaking as the primary vehicle for the executive branch's
implementation of policy in the state. 4 Writing today, I believe that
it is highly questionable whether Florida's 1996 amendments have
achieved the objectives of the reformers. I think, however, the 1996
reforms provide a useful context for examining reforms in Florida

and elsewhere aimed at fixing accountability problems, particularly
in the rulemaking context.

In this Article, I assess one of the more notable reforms Florida

made to its APA in 1996 with the intention of enhancing the
accountability of agency rulemaking, and I discuss the lessons other
state reformers can learn from Florida's experience. Part Il of this
Article discusses rulemaking authority under the Federal APA and
the more restrictive approach many states take to ensure that
agencies are accountable to the legislature in proposing rules. Some
states, including Pennsylvania, have endorsed what I will term
11 statutory

nondelegation 11:

This

is

a

judicially-adopted

or

2 &e FINAL REPORT OF TIIE GOVERNOR'S ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT
REVIEW COMMISSION 1 {1996) (citing goals of "simplifying the APA, increasing

flexibility-in the application of administrative rules and procedures, and increasing
agency accountability to the Legislature and the general public").
3 See Jim Rossi, The 1996 Revised Florida Administrative Procedure Act: A
Rulemaking Revolution or Counter-Revolution?, 49 ADMIN. L. REV. 345 (1997)
(observing that Florida's 1996 APA amendments were too fresh to provide sound
data for criticism, but that they should be re-evaluated in the future when more data
and anecdotes regarding their effects are available).
4 Section 120.54(l)(a) of Florida's APA, added in 1991 , requires agencies to
use rulemaking to make statements of general applicability to the extent it is
practicable and feasible. See Fl.A. STAT. ANN. § 120.54(1)(a) (West Supp. 1999).
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APA-imposed clear statement requirement, suggesting that courts
or administrative law judges (AI..Js ) review rules independently to
ensure that they are based in apparent and specific statutory
authority, rather than promulgated under implied powers from
general grants of authority. Similar to the nondelegation doctrine,
which exists in many states as a constitutional restraint on legislative
delegations of rulemaking authority to agencies absent specific
statutory authority and standards, statutory nondelegation is
intended to ensure that agencies are accountable to the will of the
legislature. States endorse statutory nondelegation with differing
degrees of strength: While Pennsylvania judicially endorses a
modest form of statutory nondelegation, Florida's 1996 APA
reforms exemplify a radical and strong version, similar to what the
United States Congress considered more than twenty years ago in
the failed Bumpers Amendment to the Federal APA.
In Part ill of this Article, I discuss some of the problems with
efforts to enhance accountability by requiring statutory
nondelegation in state APAs, using the recent Florida reform and
its implementation as an example. Part IV discusses Florida's 1999
APA amendments, passed primarily as a reaction to legislative
dissatisfaction with judicial interpretation of Florida's 1996 APA
amendments. In Part V, I generalize from Florida's experience to
suggest some lessons for Pennsylvania and other state reformers.
While statutory nondelegation is consistent with the concerns
of states that endorse a stronger constitutional nondelegation
doctrine than federal courts, I argue that enforcement of statutory
nondelegation is best institutionalized within a legislature, not with
ALJs or the courts. States, like Pennsylvania, that have judicially
endorsed statutory nondelegation should consider abandoning the
doctrine in APA reforms or removing courts and AI..Js from its
enforcement. Whatever a state does, though, it should steer away
from Florida's approach to statutory nondelegation. If a state
emulates Florida in adopting this provision of Florida's APA (or a
version similar to it), a range of problems relating to judicial review
and statutory interpretation are likely to emerge on the reform map,
as they have in Florida. If Florida's experience is any indication,
the resolution of such problems in the APA reform process will not
always promote sound agency policy making.
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While Florida's approach to law reform has not generated what

I believe to be desirable additions to administrative procedure for
the state, other states can learn from Florida's law reform process.
Specifically, for

as

often

as

it has amended its APA, Florida has

generally disfavored the use of law reform commissions as a vehicle
for vetting

reform proposals.

Florida's

1996 APA Review

Commission, appointed by its Governor, provided a somewhat
tempered forum for considering several modest and reasonable
reform proposals, but its temporary life did not work to limit the
proposal-and adoption-of radical administrative procedure reforms
endorsed by antiregulation interest groups in the state. States
considering APA reform might take a lesson from Florida's
experience in the APA reform process and consider establishing a
long-term

administrative

procedure

revision

commission,

as

California and Michigan have used in recent years.5 Establishing a
long-term commission, with a stake in the reform process and its
outcome, might lead

to more systematic reform proposals, allowing

for evaluation of their implementation and successes or failures.
II. STATUTORY NONDELEGATION IN FEDERAL

AND

STATE

ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE
No axiom is more clearly established in law, or in reason,
than that wherever the end is required, the means are
authorized; whenever a general power to do a thing is
given, every particular power necessary for doing it is
included.6
Madison's axiom-that the general includes the particular-is a
fundamental precept of federal administrative procedure. Although
a federal administrative agency is required to state the source of its
rulemaking authority when it provides notice of proposed rules, it

5 See Michael Asimow, Speed Bumps on the Road to Administrative Law
Reform in California and Pennsylvania, 8 WIDENER J. PuB L. 229 (1999); Steven
P. Croley, State Administrative Law Reform: Recent Experience in Michigan, 8
WIDENER]. PuB L. 347 (1999).
6 THE FEDERAUST No. 44 (James Madison).
.

.
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operates under the assumption that general legislative grants of
power

include

the

particular.

Yet

some

states,

including

Pennsylvania, have judicially required more specific statutory
authority as a basis for an agency regulation. Such requirements
find weak endorsement in the language of the 1981 Model State
Administrative Procedure Act (MSAPA),7 which requires an agency
to cite to specific statutory authority for rules. Recent state AP A
reformers, most notably in Florida, however, have set out to
strengthen the requirement of specific authority for rulemaking far
beyond what the Federal APA and the 1981 MSAPA would require.

A. Requirements in the Federal APA
Consistent with Madison's well-accepted precept, the Federal
APA does not

require an agency to have specific statutory

authority

prior to promulgating a rule. Section 553 of the Federal APA
requires an agency's notice of proposed rulemaking (NOPR) to
contain a "reference to the legal authority under which the rule is
proposed. "8 On occasion, courts have invalidated agency rules for
failure to comply with this notice requirement. For example, the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
held as reversible error the Interstate Commerce Commission's
(ICC's) failure to cite the specific statutory authorization for its
rulemaking authority in its original notice of rules regarding the
licensing of tour brokers. 9

7 MODEL STATE ADMIN. PROCEDURE ACT §§ 1-101 to 5-205 (1981), 15
U.L.A. 1-136 (1990). The 1981 MSAPA, adopted by the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, was an update and re-examination of the
1961 MSAPA. Id. , historical note, 15 U.L.A at 1 .
8 5 u.s.c. § 553(b)(2) (1994).
9 National Tour Brokers Ass'n v. United States, 591 F.2d 896, 900, 903 (D.C.
Cir. 1978) (observing, in the sole statute cited, notice was understood to need
congressional alteration or amendment and the rule finally issued was based on
different statutory authorization than the proposed rule). But see Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc. v. Hodel, 618 F. Supp. 848, 864-65 (E.D. Cal. 1985) (noting
agency's failure to cite specific statutory authorization for a rule in its notice of
proposed rulemaking is not itself a fatal procedural error where statutory
authorization is given in other referenced statrites).
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notice

requirement,

federal
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case

law

overwhelmingly suggests that a general grant of rulemaking
authority in a statute suffices to establish agency authority to
promulgate rules. The Supreme Court endorsed this principle in
10

Mourning v. Fam.fly Publications Service, Inc. , where it addressed
the Federal Reserve Board's "four installment" rule. This regulation
requires sellers to comply with the disclosure requirements of the
Truth in Lending Act to those to whom they extend consumer credit
without finance charges if the sum owed is payable in more than
four installments. In reasoning that the Board's rule did not exceed
its statutory authority, the Court stated:
The standard to be applied in determining whether the
Board exceeded the authority delegated to it under the
Truth in Lending Act is well established under our prior

cases. Where the empowering provision of a statute states
simply that the agency may "make . . . such rules and
regulations as may be necessary to carry out the provisions
of this Act," we have held that the validity of a regulation
promulgated thereunder will be sustained so long as it is
"reasonably related to the pm:poses of the enabling
legislation.

"11

Noting ambiguity in the statutory language, the Court observed
"where reasonable minds may differ as to which of several remedial
measures should be chosen, courts should defer to the informed
experience and judgment of the agency to whom Congress delegated
appropriate authority. "12 To hold the rule outside the scope of the
agency's authority, the Court reasoned, "would undermine the
flexibility sought in vesting broad rulemaking authority in an
administrative agency. "

13

Federal circuit courts routinely follow this deferential approach.
In a recent case involving the rulemaking powers of the Surface
Transportation Board (STB), the Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia held that the agency acted within its authority when it

10 411 U.S. 356 (1973).
11 Id. at 369 (citations omitted).
12 Id. at 371-72 (citations omitted).
1 3 Id. at 372.
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modified criteria adopted for exempting purchasers of short line
railroads from normal certification.14 Challengers argued that STB
was authorized by statute to deregulate, rather than adopt new
regulations.15 The District of Columbia Circuit, however, applied

Chevron deference16 and upheld the agency's interpretation of its
statutory powers to the extent the interpretation was reasonable. 17
On occasion, federal courts, however, have held that the clear
meaning of an unambiguous statute can confine an agency's
authority to promulgate rules, on either statutory18 or constitutional19

14 Association of American R.Rs. v. Surface Transp. Bel., 161F.3 d58, 60
(D.C. Cir. 1998).
IS
Id. at 62-63.
16
Under Chevron U.S.A. , Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. ,
467 U.S. 837, 8 42-43 (1984), federal courts reviewing agency interpretations of
statutes apply a two-part test. See id. At step one, a court asks "whether Congress
has directly spoken to the precise question at issue. " Id. at 8 42. If so, "the court, as
well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of
Congress. " Id. at 842-43. At step two, a Court defers to the agency's permissible
construction: "[I]f the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific
issue, the question for the court is whether the agency's answer is based on a
permissible construction of the statute." Id. at 843.
17 American R. Rs. , 161F.3d at 63 -64.
18
See, e. g. , Kelley v. Environmental Protection Agency, 15F.3 d1100, 110 6
(D.C. Cir. 199 4) (invalidating agency rule defining scope of lender liability as "in
excess of agency statutory jurisdiction, authority or limitations " under section 706
of the APA because the court read statutory language to suggest Congress "quite
consciously" left liability issues to be decided by the courts, not the EPA); Global
Van Lines, Inc. v. Interstate Commerce Comm'n, 714F.2d1290, 129 4-9 5 (5th Cir.
1983) (invalidating rule regulating entirely new sector of the industry based solely
on general statutory grants of authority, including a provision that authorized
issuance Of 'only SUCh rules and regulations
as may be necessary to carry 0Ut
[the other] provisions'") (quoting Interstate Commerce Act, pt. IV, ch. 3 18,
§ 403 (a), 56 Stat. 28 4, 285 (1942) (superseded 1978)).
1 9 A 1999 District of Columbia Circuit panel invoked the nondelegation
doctrine as a reason for reversing the Environmental Protection Agency's
interpretation of the scope of its authority to set ambient air quality standards under
the Clean Air Act. See American Trucking Ass'ns, Inc. v. Environmental Protection
Agency, 175F.3 d1027 (D.C. Cir. 1999). While the District of Columbia Circuit
panel drew on the rhetoric of nondelegation, it did not strike down the statutory
provision but only the EPA's reading of it. See id. at 1037-38. In the panel's view,
the EPA' s reading of its authority under the statute would have made Congress's
action unconstitutional.
II

•

•

•

HeinOnline -- 8 Widener J. Pub. L. 307 (1998-1999)

308

WIDENER JOURNAL OF PuBLIC LAW

[Vol. 8

grounds. Courts, however, generally defer to reasonable agency
interpretations regarding statutory authority for specific rules issued
pursuant·to general statutory grants of authority.20
The principle that agencies have sweeping authority to
promulgate rules based on nothing more than general statutory
language has on occasion been a target for federal reformers. In the
late 1970s and early 1980s, Congress considered a proposal to
significantly narrow agency rulemaking authority under the APA.
This proposal, advanced by Senator Dale Bumpers, grew out of a
dispute between the federal funding agency for education programs
and a small school district in the Senator's home state of Arkansas.
The Bumpers proposal would have amended the judicial review
sections of the APA, 21 directing courts to "require that action by the
agency is within the scope of the agency jurisdiction or authority on
the basis of the language of the statute or, in the event of ambiguity,
other evidence of ascertainable legislative intent. "22 Although the
Bumpers Amendment was not enacted into law, it did not die easily
and continued to surface for several years in reform discussions
before Congress.

20 See, e.g., Trans-Pacific Freight Conference of Japan/Korea v. Federal

Maritime Comm'n, 650 F.2d 1235 (D.C. Cir. 1980), cert. denied 451 U.S. 984
(1981) (upholding agency authority to promulgate rules regarding matters previously
adjudicated where Congress has granted both rulemaking and adjudicative
authority); Hooker Chems. & Plastics v. Train, 537 F.2d 620 (2d Cir. 1976)
(upholding the EPA's reference to general authority for rules, but reversing and
remanding on other grounds). Cf. Village of Bergen v. Federal Energy Regulatory
Comm'n, 33 F.3d 1385 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (deferring to agency's interpretation of its
own jurisdiction as a reasonable interpretation of ambiguous statutory language).
One of the reasons courts defer to agency interpretations ofjurisdiction is that they
are unable to cogently distinguish between jurisdictional and nonjurisdictional
interpretations. See Quincy M. Crawford, Comment, Chevron Deference to Agency
Interpretations that Delimit the Scope of the Agency's Jurisdiction, 61 U. Cm. L.
REv 957 (1994).
21 5 u.s.c. § 706 (1994).
22 128 CONG. REc. S1217 (daily ed. Mar. 24, 1982). For criticism of this
provision of the Bumpers Amendment, see Ronald M. Levin, Comment, Review of
"Jurisdictional" Issues Under the Bumpers Amendment, 1983 DUKE L J. 355,
371-78; James T. O'Reilly, Deference Makes a Difference: A Study of Impacts of
the Bwnpers Judicial Review Amendment, 49 U. CIN. L. REv 739, 773-76 (1980).
.

.

.
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In 1994, more than a decade after the extreme Bumpers
Amendment failed enactment, Senator Robert Dole proposed, as a
part of a cost-benefit restriction bill, a proposal intended to restrict
agency authority to promulgate new regulations. Dole's proposal
prohibited agencies from promulgating rules where it is not
necessary to achieve a statutory objective. The proposal stated:
"[A]ny rule that expands Federal power or jurisdiction beyond the
level of regulatory action needed to satisfy statutory requirements
shall be prohibited. "23 Against the spirit of federal case law, the
Dole proposal would have left to courts the task of determining
when rules are necessary for puiposes of satisfying the minimum
level of regulatory action required by statute. This amendment also
failed congressional approval.
B. Statutory Nondelegation Requirements in State Courts

Congress accepted neither the Bumpers nor the Dole proposals,
but both endorsed a principle that is supported in the decisions of
some state courts. In contrast to courts' inteipretations of
rulemaking requirements under the Federal APA, some state courts
impose more stringent standards on agencies promulgating rules.
Decisions by these courts, both in rhetoric and result, severely
restrict the authority of agencies to promulgate rules (or to regulate
more generally) absent specific authority in statutes-in effect, a
"statutory nondelegation" doctrine.
The requirement of clear and specific statutory authorization for
agency rules assists state courts in implementing the nondelegation
doctrine, which is more strongly enforced by state courts than at the
federal level. 24 By striking agency rules for failure to comply with
specific grants of legislative authority, state courts can achieve the
goals of the nondelegation doctrine without explicitly addressing the

23 S. 343, 104th Cong. § 627(a) (1995).
24 See Jim Rossi, Institutional Design and the Lingering Legacy of
Antifederalist Separation of Powers Ideals in the States, 52 VAND. L. REY. 1 167
(1999) (discussing the nondelegation doctrine in the states and explaining the
institutional design factors that may make it more necessary than in the federal
system).
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constitutional issue. Like the constitutional nondelegation doctrine,
statutory nondelegation is intended to increase the accountability of
agency rulemaking to the will of the legislature. By working as a
type of clear statement rule,25 statutory nondelegation provides some
way to assure that agencies regulate activities only where it is
manifest that the legislature intended this to occur.
For example, while Pennsylvania's APA endorses a basic
rulemaking process similar to that at the federal level, 26
Pennsylvania courts have developed a statutory nondelegation
doctrine. Courts in the state observe the standard that "power and
authority exercised by an administrative agency in its rule-making
must be conferred by language that is clear and unmistakable and
the regulatory action must be within strict and exact limits defined
by statute. "27 This standard was used to invalidate Board of
Medicine rules providing that medical and osteopathic physicians
could not use amphetamines to treat a patient unless the physician
was treating the patient for a disease the Board had decided could
receive long term amphetamine treatment. 28 The reviewing court
reasoned the Board did not have the authority to promulgate the
challenged regulations because they did not constitute a "standard

25 See, e. g. , John Copeland Nagle, Waiving Sovereign Immunity in an Age of
Clear Statement Rules, 1995 WIS. L. REv. 771 (critiquing clear statement rules,
particularly in the sovereign immunity context).
26 The rulemaking provisions of Pennsylvania's "APA" (three distinct statutes,
really) appear at 45 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 1102, 1201-1208 (West 1991).
Remaining provisions ofPennsylvania's 11APA11 are codified elsewhere. 2 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. §§ 101-754 (West 1995) (general provisions for adjudication and
judicial review); 71 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 745.2-.12 (West 1990) (Regulatory
Review Act, providing for oversight of rulemaking by the Independent Regulatory
Review Commission). The scattered provisions of Pennsylvania's statutes governing
administrative procedure make the administrative process seem more difficult than
it really is-probably not just for outsiders, like myself, but for the average citizen.
If nothing else, Pennsylvania could benefit from some of the "simplification"
measures Florida endorsed in its 1996 reforms.
ZT Pennsylvania Med. Soc'y v. State Bel. of Osteopathic Med., 546 A.2d 720,
722-23 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1988) (determining regulations are outside the authority
of agency) (citing DeMarco v. Department of Health, 397 A.2d 61 (Pa. Commw.
Ct. 1 979)).
28
Id. at 721 .
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of care" and the purpose of the statute implemented did not
"encompassO a compulsory patient-specific review of diagnoses and
treatment provided by a licensed practitioner where there is no
indication that any provision of . . . the Medical Practice Act . . .
ha[d] been violated. "29
The Pennsylvania statutory nondelegation requirement, which
can be traced to early Pennsylvania cases,30 subjects agency
rulemaking authority to a type of strict scrutiny on appeal. For
instance, in Morrison v. State Board ofMedi.cine,31 a court sustained
Board of Medicine objections to a request for declaratory judgment
authorizing a particular treatment program for cancer patients. 32 The
court reasoned that, since the "purpose of the [Medical Practice]
Act [wa]s to provide for the proper licensing of doctors by duly
constituted boards that, through administrative regulation, could set
standards of care and conduct, " approval of the requested treatment
program was "outside the scope of power granted by the
legislature. "33 Although Pennsylvania courts review the statutory
authority for agency rulemaking, they also appear to give agency
interpretations of statutes some degree of deference. 34
Pennsylvania is not unique in its judicial adoption of statutory
nondelegation. Texas courts have held that an agency can only
adopt rules "within the clear intent of the statutory authority
conferred on the agency11 and "may not impose additional burdens,
conditions, or restrictions in excess of [or inconsistent with
relevant] statutory provisions. "35 The Texas approach, by

29 Id. at 723.
30 See, e.g. , Day v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 167 A. 565, 566 (Pa. 1933). The
Day court determined that "the Public Service Commission, being a creature of the
Legislature, is vested only with those powers conferred by statute 'or such as are
implied necessarily from a grant of such powers'" and the legislative grant of
powers must be clear. Id. (quoting Harmony Elec. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 78
Pa. Super. Ct. 271, 280 (1922)).
31 618 A.2d 1098 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1992).
32 Id.
33 Id. at 1 100.
34 See Campo v. State Real Estate Comm'n, 723 A.2d 260 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
1998) (analyzing statutory authority for rule but upholding agency's rule).
35 Sinclair v. Albertson's, Inc., 975 S.W.2d 662, 666 (fex. App. 1998).
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emphasizing the requirement of clear and specific statutory

authority, 36 removes from judicial review any notion of deference

to agency statutory interpretations where statutes

are

ambiguous or

unclear, instead suggesting de novo review of agency rules for
compliance with statutory authority.
For example, a Texas appellate court, applying the doctrine,
invalidated as outside of the agency's statutory authority Railroad
Commission rules promulgated to protect the correlative rights of

oil producers. 37 The Railroad Commission cited several sources of

authority as a basis for adopting these rules, including statutory
provisions giving the Commission the authority to adopt rules
necessary to prevent waste, requiring corrective action when
conservation laws or rules are violated, and requiring persons to

.keep accurate records of oil produced. 38 After noting that none of

the statutory provisions cited by the agency expressly authorized the
use of rulemaking for purposes of protecting the correlative rights

of oil producers,39 the court addressed whether any of the provisions
impliedly granted power to the agency. The court reasoned that
each grant of rulemaking authority contained provisions delimiting
purposes for which the Commission may promulgate rules, and that
no designation of purposes included the protection of correlative
rights. 40 Thus, applying the canon expressio unius est exclusio

alterius,

the

court concluded

that

the

legislature's

express

designation of purposes implied lack of authorization for other
purposes. 41

36 Cf. Railroad Comm'n of Tex. v. City of Austin, 524 S.W.2d 262, 267 (Tex.
1975). To summarize the decisions regarding rulemaking, " [t]he Court has generally
held that the Commission has only such powers as are specifically delegated to the
Commission." Id. at 267.
37 Railroad Comm'n of Tex. v. Arco Oil & Gas Co., 876 S.W.2d 473, 481
(Tex. App. 1994).
38 Id. at 483.
39 Id.
40 Id.
41 Id. at 483-84. The court also observed that the Commission's enabling
legislation contemplated the use of an evidentiary hearing prior to the adoption of
production allocation standards. Id. at 484.
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Although illustrative of what some states do, the rigorous
approach of Pennsylvania and Texas courts in reviewing the
statutory authority for agency rules is not followed in every state.
Consider, for example, the approach of Missouri courts. The
Missouri APA, like the Federal APA, required a notice of proposed
rulemaking to contain notice of "[t]he legal authority upon which
the proposed rule is based."42 In a notice of proposed rulemaking
regarding asbestos removal regulations, the Missouri Air
Conservation Commission cited to a general rule enabling statute
that granted the agency authority to adopt rules for purposes of
complying with the Federal Clean Air Act.43 The agency failed to
cite to a section of Missouri's statutes that specifically authorized
the regulation of asbestos removal projects.44 On appeal the agency
conceded the more specific statutory authority was "more proper"
than the general grant; but, the Missouri Supreme Court refused to
reverse the agency's rulemaking.45 The court reasoned that the
broad grant of authority in the agency's general enabling statute met
the APA's notice requirement and provided an adequate legal basis
for the rule. 46
C. Statutory Nondelegation and Recent State APA Reforms

A comparison between the texts of the Federal APA and the
1981 MS.APA suggests some difference in the degree of specific
statutory authority required. In contrast to the Federal APA, which
only requires a "reference to the legal authority under which the
rule is proposed,"47 the 1981 MSAPA, requires a notice of proposed
rulemaking to contain "the specific legal authority authorizing the
proposed rule. "48 Thus, at least in its text, the language of the 1981
Mo. REv STAT. § 536.021 .2(2) (1999).
Corvera Abatement Techs., Inc. v. Air Conservation Comm'n, 973 S.W.2d
851, 855 (Mo. 1998) (en bane) (citing Mo. REv STAT. § 643.050 (1999)).
44 Id. (citing Mo. REv . STAT. § 643.225 (1999)).
s
4 Id.
46
Id.
47 5 u.s.c. § 553(b)(2) (1994).
48 MODEL STATE AD.MIN. PROCEDURE A CT, § 3-103 (1981), 15 U.L.A. 35
(1990) (emphasis added).
42

.

43

.
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MSAPA suggests a stricter standard than that in the Federal APA.
No states adopting the MSAPA, however, appear to have applied
this standard to restrict agency rulemaking authority. Although the
language of the 1981 MSAPA might parallel the approach of some
state courts, such as those in Pennsylvania and Texas, it is a weaker
standard that speaks to the procedure rather than substance of
agency rulemaking.49
Despite the modest approach of the 1981 MSAPA, more
aggressive statutory nondelegation restrictions appear in the
language of several state APAs and have been a popular mechanism
among APA reformers bent on enhancing the accountability of
agencies to the legislative branch. An example is Minnesota's AP A,
which states: "Authority to adopt original rules [is] restricted. 1150
This language suggests some limit on the statutory authority of
agencies to promulgate rules, but no cases to date have applied it to
restrict agency authority to promulgate rules.
Other recent state APA reforms, perhaps inspired by the
provision in the Dole reform bill, also include statutory
nondelegation provisions. In 1995 Washington added a section to its

49The purpose of this language in the notice standard of the 1981 MSAPA was
to reduce, not increase, the number of rules invalidated. Professor Bonfield, reporter
for the 1981 MSAPA, wrote:
Requiring the notice of proposed rule adoption to indicate the specific
legal authority supporting the issuance of that rule will help keep rule
making lawful. This requirement should increase the likelihood that
agencies will carefully consider their authority to adopt each rule they
propose prior to the time they first propose it. Over a period of time, that
should reduce the possibility that proposed rules will, on closer
consideration by agencies, tum out to be outside the scope of their
authority. The requirement that agencies specify in their notice of
proposed rule adoption the precise legal authority for their contemplated
action should also help to reduce the number of instances in which an
adopted rule will be declared invalid by a court after the agency has
expended substantial time and money to adopt it.
ARTIIUREARLBONFIELD, STATEADMINISTRATIVERUI.EMAKING 175-76 (1986). It
seems that how exacting and rigid courts are in their expectations of statutory
precision will determine how frequently agency rules are reversed, but Bonfield's
interpretation of the notice requirement suggests that it is a procedural rather than
a substantive one.
50 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 14.05(1) (West 1997 & Supp. 1999).
•
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APA that states "an agency may not rely solely on the section of
[the] law stating a statute's intent or purpose, or on the enabling
provisions of the statute establishing the agency, or on any
combination of such provisions, for its statutory authority to adopt
the rule. "51 Florida's 1996 APA revisions went a step further,
adding to its APA a remarkable section which states:
A grant of rulemaking authority is necessary but not
sufficient to allow an agency to adopt a rule; a specific law
to be implemented is also required. An agency may adopt
only rules that implement, interpret, or make specific the
particular powers and duties granted by the enabling
statute. No agency shall have authority to adopt a rule only
because it is reasonably related to the purpose of the
enabling legislation and is not arbitrary and capricious, nor
shall an agency have the authority to implement statutory
provisions setting forth general legislative intent or policy.
Statutory language granting rulemaking authority or
generally describing the powers and functions of an agency
shall be construed to extend no further than the particular
powers and duties conferred by the same statute. 52
This 1996 Florida reform, which echoes aspects of the lapsed
Federal Bumpers Amendment and Dole reform proposal, is perhaps
the most restrictive of those in state APAs, and thus worthy of some
discussion. Florida's 1996 statutory nondelegation standard
modified preexisting case law that held, consistent with the United
States Supreme Court's decision in Mourning, that a rule is valid if
it is reasonably related to the enabling statute and not arbitrary and
capricious.53
51 WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 34.05.322 (West Supp. 1999).
52 Fr.A. STAT. ANN. § 120.536(1) (West Supp. 1999) (amended 1999). As is
discussed infra in Part IV, the language of this standard was amended in 1999, but
its overall structure remains in Florida's APA.
53 As the Florida Supreme Court stated:
Where the empowering provision of a statute states simply that an agency
may "make such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out
the provisions of this Act," the validity of the regulations promulgated
thereunder will be sustained as long as they are reasonably related to the
purposes of the enabling legislation, and are not arbitrary or capricious.
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statutory nondelegation requirement is also incorporated
into the "[i]nvalid exercise of delegated legislative authority"
standard for AI.J review of challenged rules in section 120.52(8) of
Florida's APA.54 In Florida, rules can be challenged before an AU
on several grounds, including failure to comply with this statutory
nondelegation standard. 55 Proposed rules are immediately subject to
the new standard. 56 For an interim period, existing rules were
evaluated by agencies and by the Legislature to determine whether
additional statutory authorization was necessary. Following July 1,
1999, all existing rules were subject to legal challenge based on the
new statutory nondelegation standard. 57
Florida's 1996 statutory nondelegation provision caught many
agencies by surprise. The proposal, borrowed from language in an
APA reform bill Governor Chiles vetoed in 1995, was incorporated
into Florida's APA without independent evaluation by the APA
Review Commission. Governor Chiles did not express strong
protest to this provision, as he did several other aspects of the
vetoed 1995 reforms. Notably, the Review Commission did not
explicitly recommend adoption of the statutory nondelegation
standard in 1997. Instead, the provision (based on a provision in the
amended 1995 bill) was added to the APA amendments during the
legislative adoption process, at the urging of interest groups
attempting to reign in agency power in a climate where
antiregulation sentiment ran strong. These same interest groups
failed to have the provision adopted in their previous reform efforts,
but were able to attach it to the larger, more moderate APA reform
bill drafted by the Review Commission. The APA Review
Commission did not debate or consider fully the arguments for and
This

General Tel. Co. ofFlorida v. Florida Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 446 So. 2d 1063, 1067
(Fla. 1984) (quoting Agrico Chem. Co. v. State Dep't ofEnvtl. Regulation, 365 So.
2d 759 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1978), cert. denied, 316 So. 2d 74 (Fla. 1979);
Florida Beverage Cotp. v. Wynne, 306 So. 2d 200 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1975)).
54 See FLA STAT. ANN . § 120.52(8) (West Supp. 1999) (amended 1999).
ss
See id. § 120.56 (West 1996). Minnesota also provides for rule validity
challenges before an AD. See WILUAM J. KEPPEL, 21 MINNEsOTA PRACTICE:
ADMINIS1RATIVE PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 149-64 (1998).
56 See FLA STAT. ANN . § 120.536 (West Supp. 1999) (amended 1999).
51 See id. § 120.536(2) (amended 1999).
.

.
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against adding a statutory nondelegation provision to Florida's
AP A. Because it focused its efforts on other issues in its limited
life, the Review Commission did not assess the impact of this
provision on other APA provisions, agency decisionmaking, and
judicial review. Hence, Florida in 1996 adopted a major
modification to state administrative procedure witliout serious
consideration of its effects on administrative governance.
ill. THE PROBLEMS WITH STATUTORY NONDELEGATION

When considered solely through the lens of legislative
accountability, statutory nondelegation standards, like the
constitutional nondelegation doctrine, appear to be well-intended
efforts to enhance the accountability of agency decisionmaking. For
many reformers, efforts to restrict the power of agency regulatory
authority hold promise to enhance legitimacy and accountability in
the regulatory process. Legislators see a particular advantage to
such provisions, as statutory nondelegation allows a legislature the
constitutional power to delegate and to take credit for reigning in
the decisions of agencies, particularly where a constituent is
dissatisfied with the regulatory result.
Statutory nondelegation, however, poses some serious
operational problems for agency governance to the extent it
becomes a part of the general fabric of state administrative
procedure-either by judicial adoption or by legislative addition to
a state's APA. There are many problems with statutory
nondelegation. First, such restrictions are inherently difficult to
interpret, introducing high levels of uncertainty into judicial and
agency decisionmaking. Like the constitutional nondelegation
doctrine, such restrictions are subject to selective enforcement, and
thus are not likely to achieve their intended result. Second, because
of the conflict between interpretive ambiguities, on the one hand,
and legislative directive to restrict agency authority, on the other,
such restrictions may invite courts (and ALls) to tread into the
political process, rather than defer to agency interpretations of
statutes. Third, while such restrictions are designed to increase the
quality of the legislative process-encouraging legislative
deliberation about the specifics of regulatory programs before such
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programs are authorized-their effects on legislative accountability
are questionable.
Florida's experience with its 1996 statutory nondelegation
provision illustrates these problems. The false promise of statutory
nondelegation has brought other reform issues, such as agency
interpretation of statutes and judicial review, to the fore in Florida.
A. Interpreting "Particular Powers and Duties":
The Florida Experience

In 1998 the Florida state courts interpreted Florida's new

statutory nondelegation provision. The most notable decision is St.

Johns River Water Management District v. Consolidated-Tomoka

Land Company, 58

an opinion written by a panel of Florida's First
District Court of Appeal, its main appellate court hearing
administrative law cases. Despite the "particular powers and duties"
language added to Florida's APA in 1996, this case upheld an
agency's authority to promulgate rules without detailed legislative
authorization addressing each promulgated rule. In this sense,
Consolidated-Tomoka might be interpreted as a judicial effort to
temper the counter-revolution against rulemaking in Florida's 1996
APA amendments.59
The Consolidated-Tomoka case began with a challenge to rules
promulgated by a Water Management District in the state. The rules
established two new hydrologic basins in the District's region and
established new standards pertaining to runoff, recharge, storm
water systems, and riparian wildlife.60 In a rule challenge, an ALl
determined that the proposed rules were supported by competent
substantial evidence and that they were not arbitrary or capricious.

58 717 So. 2d 72 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1998). For discussion of the case and
its implications, see Martha Mann, St. Johns River Water Management District v.
Consoliclated-Tomoka Land Co.: Defining Agency Rulemaking Authority Under the
1996Revisions to the FloridaAdministraJive Proce®re Act, 26 FLA. ST. U. L. REY.
517 (1999).
59 See Rossi, supra note 3, at 352-53 (discussing the provisions of the 1996
amendments).
60 Consolidated-Tomoka, 717 So. 2d at 75.
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The ALT, however, reasoned that the rules were invalid because
they were not within the "'particular powers and duties'" granted by
the enabling statutes, as required by the new standard in Florida's
APA.61 Statutory language directed the agency to '"not [allow]
harmD to the water resources,"' to .. 'delineate areas within the
district wherein permits may be required,'" and to "require such
permits and impose such reasonable conditions" to comply with
state law. 62 Despite this language, the ALT determined that this
statutory authorization was inadequate under the new statutory
nondelegation standard. 63
The Consolidated-Tomoka panel unanimously reversed the
ALT' s decision. 64 Based on the language of the APA and aided by
dictionary meaning, the court observed that there were two possible
interpretations of the word "particular" in Florida's statutory
nondelegation provision. 65 According to the court, either the APA
could mean that the powers and duties designated by the statute
must be "particular" in the sense that they are limited to a
specifically identified class, or it could mean that they were
"particular" in the sense that they were described in detail. 66 The
ALJ's decision, which required very detailed description of
regulated powers, adopted the latter meaning.
The judicial panel disagreed with the ALT' s interpretation that
"particular powers and duties" required a minimum level of detail
in the statute. 67 Instead, the court held that section 120.52(8)
"restricts rulemaking authority to subjects that are directly within
the class of powers and duties identified in the enabling statute. "68
The court further elaborated: "The question is whether the rule falls
within the range ofpowers the Legislature has granted to the agency
for the purpose of enforcing or implementing the statutes within its
·

61

Id.
Id.
63 Id.
64 Id.
65
Id.
66
Id.
1>1 Id.
68
Id.
62

at 76 (quoting FLA. STAT. ANN. § 120.52(8) (West Supp. 1996)).
at 78 (quoting FLA. STAT. ANN. § 120.52(8) (West Supp. 1996)).
at 79.
at 79, 81.
at 79.
at 79-80.
at 79.
(emphasis added).
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jurisdiction."69 The new standard, the court observed, "is a
functional test based on the nature of the power or duty at issue and
not the level of detail in the language of the applicable statute. 1170
Two concerns with the AU ' s interpretation of the "particular
powers and duties" standard animated the court's decision. First,
the court reasoned, the AU' s standard, which requires a statute
describing in detail the subject matter of each rule proposed, "would
be difficult to define and even more difficult to apply. "71 As the
court wrote, "[a]n argument could be made in nearly any case that
the enabling statute is not specific enough to support the precise
subject of a rule, no matter how detailed the Legislature tried to be
in describing the power delegated to the agency. "72 Second, the
court observed, the All's interpretation, which is more restrictive
of agency authority than the court's, would place agencies between
two conflicting commands in Florida's APA.73 While Pennsylvania
places some limitations on agency discretion to choose to use
rulemaking, 74 Florida is much more restrictive. In Florida,
"[r]ulemaking is not a matter of agency discretion"75 and agencies
are required to adopt rules to the extent it is "feasible and
practicable. "76 But, "[i]f the lack of detail in the enabling statute
could be said to prohibit an agency from adopting rules . . ., the
agency might not be able to carry out the very task the Legislature
assigned to it. "77 By implication, the court reasoned that agencies
must have the authority to adopt rules within the class of powers
conferred by the applicable enabling statute, and must not be limited

69

Id. at 80 (emphasis added).
Id.
1 1 Id.
72 Id.
13 Id.
74 See Terrance J. Fitzpatrick, The Choice Between Adjudication and
Rulemakingfor Developing Administrative Policy in Pennsylvania, 4 WIDENER].
PuB . L. 373, 381 (1995) (indicating that some Pennsylvania cases have held that
10

"agencies have discretion to develop policy via adjudication or rulemaking").
15 FLA . STAT. ANN. § 120.54(l)(a) (West Supp. 1999).
16

77

Id.
Consolidated-Tomoka, 717 So. 2d at 80.
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to adopting rules only where a statute describes " in detail the subject
of each potential rule. "78

Much like the addition of the statutory nondelegation provision
to

Florida's

APA,

the

case

surprised

many

in

Florida.

Consolidated-Tomoka has been a topic of much controversy-even
leading to some additional modifications to Florida's APA in

1999.79 The case and its aftermath in Florida illustrate some of the
problems with statutory nondelegation, whether judicially-adopted
or legislatively-imposed in an APA.

B. Enforcement Problems
Statutory nondelegation restrictions are inherently difficult to
interpret, introducing high levels of uncertainty into judicial and
agency

decisionmaking.

As

the

court

itself

noted

in

Consolidated-Tomoka:
A standard based on the sufficiency of detail in the
language of the enabling statute would be difficult to
define and even more difficult to apply. Specificity is a
subjective concept that cannot be neatly divided into
identifiable degrees. Moreover, the concept is one that is
relative. What is specific enough in one circumstance may

be too general in another. An argument could be made in

nearly any case that the enabling statute is not specific
enough to support the precise subject of a rule, no matter
how detailed the Legislature tried to be in describing the

0

power delegated to the agency. 8

Like the constitutional nondelegation doctrine, statutory restrictions
are subject to seleetive enforcement, and thu s are not likely to
achieve their intended result.

81

Id.
79 These amendments are discussed infra at Part IV.
80 Consolidated-Tomoka, 717 So. 2d at 80.
81
See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., 11ze Rok of the Judiciary in lmpkmenting an
Agency Theory of Government, 64 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1239, 1244-47 (1989); Richard
J. Pierce, Jr., Political Accountability and Dekgated Power: A Response to
Professor Lowi, 36 AM. U. L. REv. 391, 402-07 (1987); Carl McGowan, Congress,
18

'
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The problem of selective enforcement becomes apparent when
the opinion in Consolidated-Tomoka is contrasted with that in
Department ofBusiness and Professional Regulation v. Calder Race
Course, Inc. , 82

a decision issued by a different panel of the same
court on the same day. In Calder, the court applied Florida's
statutory nondelegation section to uphold an AU ' s invalidation of
Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering (Division) rules authorizing
warrantless searches of pari-mutuel wagering facilities. As its
rulemaking authority, the Division cited statutory provisions that
empowered it to "'adopt reasonable rules for the control,
supervision, and direction of all applicants, permitees, and licensees
and for the holding, conducting, and operating of all racetracks,
race meets, and races held in this state.'"83 In addition, the Division
cited a provision of the same statute that authorized it to conduct
"investigations. "84 The court noted, however, that since "nothing in
. this subsection identifies the power that the rule attempts to
implement, that is, to search,"85 the agency's proposed rules
exceeded its grant of authority.
The Consolidated-Tomoka and Calder duo illustrates the
indeterminacy of judicial application of Florida's statutory
nondelegation standard. In Calder, the court concluded that the
'"class of powers and duties identified in the statute'" did not
include the power to conduct warrantless searches. 86 At the same
time, it seems that a reasonable interpretation of the statute
authorizing rulemaking and investigations by the Division could
include the power to conduct warrantless searches. Following

Court, and Control ofDekgated Power, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 1119, 1128-30 (1977);
see also SORTIRIUS BARBER, THE CONSTITUTION AND TIIE DELEGATION OF
LEGISLATIVE POWER 62, 76 (1975) (descn'bing nondelegation doctrine as "heavily
encrusted with the constructs of judicial myth-making" and revealing a "judicial
propensity to manipulate"); Lours JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE
ACTION 51, 56 (1965) (finding court's reasoning in the nondelegation context as
"hopelessly fictional rationalization" and "sheer illusion").
82 724 So. 2d 100 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
83 Id. at 102 (quoting FLA. STAT. ANN § 550.0251(3) (West 1992)).
84 I d. (quoting FLA. STAT. ANN § 550.0251(9) (West 1992)).
85 Id. at 102.
86
Id. at 105 (quoting Consolidated- Tonwka, 717 So. 2d at 80).
.

.

HeinOnline -- 8 Widener J. Pub. L. 322 (1998-1999)

1999]

323

"STATUTORY NONDELEGATION"

Calder, it is clear that courts will enforce Florida's statutory
nondelegation doctrine, yet for agencies it is not at all clear when.
In addition, for the Legislature, which needs to evaluate existing
and new statutes for compliance, it is not clear how much
specificity is required. Thus, to the extent we rely on courts to
implement

restrictions

on

regulatory

authority,

statutory

nondelegation poses some of the same enforcement problems as
constitutional nondelegation: Courts are simply not capable of
articulating a coherent and consistent set of standards for evaluating

the sufficiency of grants of power to administrative agencies. 87

C. Effects on Agency Accountability: Who Should
Interpret the Statutory Authority to Regulate ?
Institutionally, a legislature is probably even less capable than
a court of articulating a clear and understandable nondelegation
standard. No single standard articulated by a legislature in advance
of its evaluation of a particular regulatory program, especially a
standard that is the product of political compromise, is likely to
provide guidance for regulators. At the same time, statutory
nondelegation encourages legal challenges to agency regulations.
Statutory nondelegation invites courts (and, in some states, ALTs)
to tread into the political process, rather than defer to agency
interpretations

of statutes

because

of the

tension

between

interpretive ambiguities, on the one hand, and a discemable
legislative intent to restrict agency authority, on the other. This
impairs agency flexibility in the implementation of regulatory
programs and also runs the risk of undermining the agency
accountability goals that proponents of statutory nondelegation often
embrace.
In Calder, for example, a Florida appellate court applied its
own independent interpretation of whether investigations included
warrantless searches; despite the ambiguity in the Legislature' s
grant of power, the court refused to defer to the agency's reasonable

87 See supra note 81 (sources discussing indeterminacy problem with
constitutional nondelegation doctrine).
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interpretation that investigations included warrantless searches.

88

This raises the issue of who interprets statutes, an issue that is not
as settled in the stat� as it is in the federal system.
Like the courts of many other states, Florida courts have
8
endorsed a doctrine similar to Skidmore v. Swift 9 (giving some
weight to the agency interpretation) if not Chevron (accepting the

agency' s reasonable interpretation where the statute is unclear or
ambiguous)90 deference in federal courts. If an agency interpretation
of a statute in its regulatory area "is within the range of permissible
interpretations of the statute, " in Florida, the standard of review is
well established: courts defer to the agency interpretation, even
though other interpretations may be permissible or preferable. 91

88
89

Calder, 124 So. 2d at 102-03.
323 U.S. 134 (1944). Under Skidmore, the degree of weight may "depend

upon the thoroughness evident in [the agency's] consideration, the validity of its
reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those
factors which give it [the] power to persuade, if lacking power to control." Id. at
140. The approach is used in many states. See William A. McGrath et al., Project:
State Judicial Review of Administrative Action, 43 ADMIN. L. REY. 571, 768-70
(1991).
00 Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S.
837, 842-43 (1984); see also supra note 16 (discussing Chevron test). According to
a 1990 study, eleven states had adopted tests that bear similarity to strong Chevron
deference. See McGrath et al., supra note 89, at 763-66. I believe that Florida
adopts an analysis very similar to Chevron.
91 State Dept. of Health and Rehabilitative Servs. v. Framat Realty, Inc., 407
So. 2d 238, 241-42 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1981); see also Department ofEnvtl.
Regulation v. Goldring, 477 So. 2d 532, 534 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (holding
that "[c]ourts should afford great deference to administrative interpretations of
statutes which the administrative agency is required to enforce"); Pringle v. Marine
Fisheries Comm'n, 732 So. 2d 395, 397 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1999) (stating that
"[t]he courts a.re bound to give deference to an agency's interpretation of statutes the
agency is charged with implementing"); Smith v. Crawford, 645 So. 2d 513, 520-21
(Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1994) (providing deference to agency interpretation of
statute); Harloff v. City of Sarasota, 575 So. 2d 1324, 1327 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.
1991) (stating "[b]ecause agency boards are charged with the responsibility of
enforcing the statutes which govern their area of regulation, courts give great weight
to their interpretation of those statutes"); accord, Board of Optometry v. Florida
Soc'y of Opthamology, 538 So. 2d 878, 885 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1988)
(suggesting agency's interpretation need not be the most desirable one, but needs
only to be within the range of permissible interpretations).
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While well-established as a

standard for reviewing agency

intei:pretations of ambiguous statutory language, Florida courts also
recognize that in some instances deference is not appropriate. Some
Florida courts have stated that they do not defer to " clearly
erroneous" agency interpretations, although they also suggest that
they

do

not

review

statutory

intei:pretations

de

novo

for

reasonableness;92 thus, clearly erroneous review might be thought
of as the judicial basis for rejecting agency interpretations that
conflict with clear and unambiguous statutory language, paralleling
the step-one Chevron inquiry. 93 Florida courts also express some

92 See D.A.B. Constructors, Inc. v. Department of Transp., 656 So. 2d 940,
944 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1995) (stating that " [a]n agency's construction of a
statute which it administers is entitled to great weight and will not be overturned
unless the agency's interpretation is clearly erroneous"); Orange Park Kennel Club,
Inc. v. Department of Bus. and Prof'l Regulation, 644 So. 2d 574, 576 (Fla. 1st
Dist. Ct. App. 1994) (noting that, since court is unable to determine that agency's
interpretation of a statute is "clearly erroneous, " deference is appropriate).
93 See Department oflns. & Treasurer v. Bankers Ins. Co., 694 So. 2d 70, 71
(Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1997) (stating that " [w]here a statute draws an uncertain
boundary, judicial deference to an agency's jurisdictional determination is
appropriate"); Willette v. Air Prods., 700 So. 2d 397, 399 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
1997) (rejecting an agency's statutory interpretation as "unmistakably at odds with
[the] clear statutory language"); Associated Mortgage Investors v. Department of
Bus. Regulation, 503 So. 2d 379, 380 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.), review dismissed,
506 So. 2d 1040 (Fla. 1987) (holding that "interpretation, made by the agency
charged with enforcing a statute, should be accorded great deference unless there is
clear error or conflict with the intent of the statute"); see also Okeechobee Health
Care v. Collins, 726 So. 2d 775, 778 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1998) (distinguishing
Willette v. Air Prods. , 100 So. 2d 397, 399 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1997), and
applying deference to ambiguous statutory language).
Clearly erroneous (or "clear err") is a troubling standard to apply to the
review of statutes, as it typically is a standard of review for findings of fact. Some
Florida appellate courts have conflated, or confused, the clearly erroneous standard
in reviewing statutes with a "reasonableness" test. See Las Olas Tower Co. v. City
of Fort Lauderdale, No. 97-2791, 1999 WL 31 1248, at *3 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
May 12, 1999) (noting preference for deference to the agency, but "when the
agency's construction of a statute amounts to an unreasonable interpretation, or is
clearly erroneous, it cannot stand"). In the rulemaking context, this confusion may
be less prevalent because Florida's APA purports to limit courts from independently
assessing the rationality of an agency's reasoning process. See FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 120.68(9) (West 1999) (proluoiting reviewing courts from applying arbitrary and
capricious review of rules apart from their review of an All's findings regarding
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reluctance to defer to an agency statutory interpretation "if the

statute is unrelated to the functions of the agency. "94 Despite these
exceptions for clearly erroneous interpretations or interpretations of
a statute outside of an agency's regulatory area, principles of
deference to agency statutory interpretations are well established in
Florida courts .
While deference

to agency interpretation of ambiguous statutes

is well accepted in Florida, statutory nondelegation threatens it. By
requiring courts to assess the specificity of statutory language,
statutory nondelegation invites more frequent de novo review of
agency

statutory

interpretation

than

is

expected

under

the

conventional approach. This risks judicial second guessing of
agency expertise, as well as reduced accountability, to the extent
judges, not as politically accountable as agency heads, become the
primary interpreters of statutes.
Further complicating this issue, in some states, such as Florida,
rules

are

subject to challenge before AL.Ts. AL.Ts, however, are not

bound to agency statutory interpretations, nor does state law always
clearly require ALT deference to agency statutory interpretations .
Unlike agency interpretations, which might be legitimated by
reference to political accountability or agency expertise, statutory
interpretation by AL.Ts, impartial generalists, should not be subject
to the same deference. Thus, to the extent courts review final
agency action by AL.Ts, either deference to the agency or de novo
review is necessary to ensure accountable statutory interpretation.
Florida made matters worse in its 1996 amendments by

reversing the burden of proof in rule challenges . In Florida until

1996, proposed rules were subject to a "presumption of validity . "
In other words, when a rule was challenged, the burden was on the
person attacking the rule to prove by a preponderance of the
evidence that the rule was arbitrary and capricious or otherwise ran

arbitrary and capricious agency action). Nevertheless, when misapplied in Florida,
clearly erroneous may be one back door way to see arbitrary and capricious review
of agency statutory interpretation where it otherwise is not allowed.
94 Chiles v. Department of State, 711 So. 2d 1$1, 155 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
1998).
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afoul of Florida' s APA. 95 Most, if not all, states96 follow a similar

rule. The 1996 Florida APA revisions, however, provide a process

for parties to shift the burden of proving the validity of proposed
rules to administrative agencies. When any substantially affected
person seeks to challenge a proposed rule as invalid before a
Division of Administrative Hearings (DOAH) AIJ, "the proposed
rule is not presumed to be valid or invalid. "97 The agency, however,
will now bear the burden of proving a rule's rationality: The 1996
revisions require agencies to prove in a proposed rule challenge
proceeding that the proposed rule is not an invalid exercise of
delegated authority in response to each of the objections raised by
the challenger.98 The 1996 revisions also allow " [a] substantially
affected person [to] seek an administrative determination of the
invalidity of an existing rule at any time during the existence of the
rule. "99 The presumption of validity continues to apply for existing
rules in Florida under the 1996 APA revisions. Once a challenger

95 See Department of labor and Employment Sec. v. Bradley, 636 So. 2d 802,
807 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1994) (noting that the validity of regulations will be
sustained so long as " 'they are reasonably related to the purposes of the enabling
legislation, and are not arbitrary or capricious'") (quoting Adam Smith Enters. v.
Department of Envtl. Regulation, 553 So. 2d 1260, 1271 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
1989); State Dep't of Health and Rehabilitative Servs. v. Framat Realty, Inc., 407
So. 2d 238, 241 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1981) (stating that agency interpretation of
statutes entitled to presumption of validity); Agrico Chem. Co. v. Department of
Envtl. Regulation, 365 So. 2d 759, 762 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1978) (holding that
"[r}ulemaking by an agency is quasi-legislative action and must be considered with
deference to that function").
96 Pennsylvania is clearly in this group. See Snelling v. Department of Transp.,
366 A.2d 1298 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1976) (noting the "presumption that the actions of
public officials are within the limits" of their discretion").
97 FLA. STAT. ANN . § 120.56(2)(c) (West Supp. 1999) (amended 1999).
Although slightly amended in 1999, this general provision remains in force.
98 Id. § 120.56(2)(a). Section 120.56(2)(a) states:
The petition [challenging the rule) shall state with particularity the
objections to the proposed rule and the reasons that the proposed rule is
an invalid exercise ofdelegated legislative authority. The agency then has
the burden to prove that the proposed rule is not an invalid exercise of
delegated legislative authority as to the objections raised.
Id.
99 Id. § 120.56(3)(a).
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has established a factual basis for objections to a rule, 100 however,
the agency bears the burden of proving it followed applicable
procedure and failure to follow applicable procedure is deemed
material error.101 The Bumpers Amendment to the Federal APA also
stated a reviewing court "shall not accord any presumption in favor
of or against agency action. 11102
When confusion over the review of state agency interpretation
of statutes is coupled with the uncertain status of arbitrary and
capricious review in many states, 103 a need for state APA reformers
to clarify the role of courts in reviewing agency rules is apparent.
Indeed, as is discussed below, in Spring 1999, the role of Florida
courts was the subject of an APA reform bill that would have
prohibited courts from giving any deference or weight to agency
interpretations of statutes, as they currently do. 104 Perhaps it would
have been better for Florida reformers to address judicial review
independent of the statutory nondelegation issue, where conflicts
between agency, AJJ, and judicial statutory interpretation are at the
heart of prominent regulatory disputes involving constituents with
entrenched positions in disputes, such as the environmental
regulation matter at issue in Consolidated-Tomoka.
D. Effects on Legis'lative Process and Accountability

In a sense, statutory nondelegation may work as a type of
precommitment device for a legislature, deterring future legislatures
100

See St. Johns River Management Dist. v. Consolidated-Tomoka Land Co. ,
7 1 7 S o . 2d 72, 77 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. 1998) (holding i n interpreting section
120.56(2)(a) that " [a] party challenging a proposed rule bas the burden of
establishing a factual basis for the objections to the rule, and then the agency has the
ultimate burden of persuasion to show that the proposed rule is a valid exercise of
delegated legislative authority").
101
FLA . STAT. ANN. § 120.56(1)(c) (West Supp. 1999).
102
128 CONG. REC. S2717 (daily ed. Mar. 24, 1982) (statement of Sen.
Bumpers).
103
William Funk, in his 1991 survey of state rationality review, reports that
only eight states follow the federal example of providing a statutory basis for judicial
review of the rationality of rules. William Funk, Rationality Review of State
Administrative Rulemaking, 43 ADMIN. L. REv. 147, 154 (1991).
104
This 1999 reform bill is discussed infra at Part N.

HeinOnline -- 8 Widener J. Pub. L. 328 (1998-1999)

"STATUTORY NONDELEGATION"

1999]

329

from delegating without very specific statutory guidance. In
practice, it is difficult for a legislature to avoid delegation, because

reaching a consensus on specific statutory language may prove

costly or impossible. Even if a legislature can overcome this

problem,

however,

it

is

questionable

whether

statutory

nondelegation works to enhance legislative accountability.
While such restrictions are in part designed to improve the
quality

of

the

legislative

process-encouraging

legislative

deliberation about the specifics of regulatory programs before such
programs are authorized-they may have the opposite result, placing
legislatures in the reactive posture of enacting en rriasse "compliance
bills"

ratifying agency regulations.

For example,

following

Florida's adoption of a statutory nondelegation standard, over 5,000
agency

rules-more

than

twenty

percent

of

Florida's

regulations-were determined to be out of compliance with the new
standard. 105 The Legislature sent this list of rules, compiled by
Florida' s Joint Administrative Procedures Committee with input
from each agency' s evaluation of its existing rules for compliance,
to the President of the Florida Senate and the Speaker of the House.
The Legislature then acted on this list, enacting over two dozen
rules authorizing bills in 1998. 106 This may have served a useful

tos

See JOINT ADMIN. PROC. COMMITrEE, 1997 ANNUAL REPORT, at 62.
The following bill numbers were passed as RABs: S. Res. 734, 16th Leg.
(Fla. 1999); S. Res. 768, 16th Leg. (Fla. 1999); S. Res. 770, 16th Leg. (Fla. 1999);
S. Res. 1346, 16th Leg. (Fla. 1999); S. Res. 1342, 16th Leg. (Fla. 1999); S. Res.
1350, 16th Leg. (Fla. 1999); S. Res. 1706, 16th Leg. (Fla. 1999); S. Res. 1762,
16th Leg. (Fla. 1999); S. Res. 1152, 16th Leg. (Fla. 1999); S. Res. 1720, 16th Leg.
(Fla. 1999); S. Res. 1708, 16th Leg. (Fla. 1999); S. Res. 1700, 16th Leg. (Fla.
1999); S. Res. 1702, 16th Leg. (Fla. 1999); S. Res. 2316, 16th Leg. (Fla. 1999);
S. Res. 2000, 16th Leg. (Fla. 1999); S. Res. 2314, 16th Leg. (Fla. 1999); S. Res.
1722, 16th Leg. (Fla. 1999); S. Res. 1 144, 16th Leg. (Fla. 1999); S. Res. 1684,
16th Leg. (Fla. 1999); S. Res. 1332, 16th Leg. (Fla. 1999); S. Res.1410, 16th Leg.
(Fla. 1999); S. Res. 1716, 16th Leg. (Fla. 1999); S. Res. 1348, 16th Leg. (Fla.
1999); S. Res. 1232, 16th Leg. (Fla. 1999); S. Res. 1334, 16th Leg. (Fla. 1999);
S. Res. 1336, 16th Leg. (Fla. 1999); S. Res. 1436, 16th Leg. (Fla. 1999); S. Res.
1440, 16th Leg. (Fla. 1999); S. Res. 1164, 16th Leg. (Fla. 1999); S. Res. 1054,
16th Leg. (Fla. 1999); S. Res. 1052, 16th Leg. (Fla. 1999); S. Res. 846, 16th Leg.
(Fla. 1999); S. Res. 1710, 16th Leg. (Fla. 1999). A few (three or four) RABs did
not pass and remain under consideration.
106
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housekeeping function, but the conventional understanding is that
few, if any, of these statutes were the subject of intense legislative
deliberation and debate regarding the scope of delegated power.
If accountability in the form of more specific and clearer
statutes authorizing agency rulemaking is the goal of statutory
nondelegation, there may be more effective means for achieving this
goal. For example, a legislature could adopt better (that is, more
specific and clearer) grants of legislative authority if it considered
limitations on agency rulemaking authority in subject-specific
contexts, referring these to the legislative committees responsible
for regulating certain areas. Under this approach, a legislature
would be responsible for specifically prohibiting an agency from
regulating certain activities, rather than attempting to mandate
statutory precision generally through the judicially-imposed APA
statutory nondelegation. This is similar to the approach taken by
federal courts.
On the other hand, to the extent APA reformers are wed to
enhancing agency accountability to the legislature, statutory
nondelegation should be enforced by legislative committees rather
than courts. To the extent state legislatures affinnatively vest
enforcement of statutory nondelegation with courts (and also, as in
Florida, ALJs), they can claim credit for limiting the scope of
agency powers without taking responsibility for defining these
powers in specific regulatory contexts. Legislative definition and
enforcement of agency rulemaking powers in specific regulatory
contexts, however, would lead to more responsible decisionmaking
by a legislature.
Pennsylvania's Independent Regulatory Review Commission
(IRRC), for example, already has some authority to review
regulations for "confonnity to legislative intent"1rn and requires "[a]
specific citation to . . . statutory or regulatory authority" for
regulations, 108 but this works in conjunction with the possibility of
judicial review enforcement of statutory nondelegation. Not all
states that adhere to a statutory nondelegation standard for

107
108

71 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 745.2 (West Supp. 1998).
Id. § 745.5(a)(l. 1).
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rulemaking vest some enforcement with courts. For example, in
California the Office of Administrative Law (OAL) has the
authority to disapprove rules based on a lack of "necessity" as well
as lack of "authority" or failure to include a "reference. 11 109
"Necessity" means that there is substantial evidence.in the record
that the regulation is needed. 110 "Authority" refers to "the provision
of law which permits or obligates the agency to adopt, amend, or
repeal a regulation. "111 The regulations also define "Reference" as
"the statute, court decision, or other provision of law which the
agency implements . . . by adopting, amending, or repealing a
regulation. " 112 The OAL regulations include as a source of authority
"a California constitutional or statutory provision [which] grants a
power to the agency which impliedly permits or obligates the
agency to adopt, amend, or repeal the regulation in order to achieve
the purpose for which the power was granted. " 113 Thus the OAL,
which wields a heavy stick as the enforcer of California rulemaking
limitations, takes the position that an implied grant of authority is
sufficient. Nevertheless, even if California's OAL had reached a
different conclusion about its role, enforcing statutory nondelegation
more strictly, California would have more legislative accountability
than states like Pennsylvania, Texas, or Florida, which rely at least
in part on courts (or ALTs) to enforce the statutory nondelegation
doctrine.

109 CAL. GOV'T CODE § 1 1349.l(a)(l), (2), (5) (West Supp. 1999).
1 10 Id. § 1 1349(a).
Ill

Id. § 1 1349(b).

1 12 Id. § 1 1349(e).
1 13 CAL. CODE. REGS., tit. 1, § 14(a)(2) (1999).
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1999 APA AMENDMENTS:

CONTINUED LEGISLATIVE ENDORSEMENT
OF THE COUNTER-REVOLUTION AGAINST RULEMAKING

When Florida added statutory nondelegation to its APA in
1996, the new provision received little notice. In the aftennath of
its revised APA, the 1997 Florida legislative session addressed
some minor APA revisions in a glitch bill, 114 but statutory
nondelegation was not an issue before the Legislature at that time.
Yet in 1999, following judicial interpretation of Florida's statutory
nondelegation provision, Florida's Legislature again considered
major APA refonns. Governor Jeb Bush signed new amendments
to the Florida APA into law in Summer 1999. 115 Not surprisingly,
the major issues addressed by the 1999 APA amendments are
statutory nondelegation and agency interpretations of law, issues the
Florida Legislature brought to the forefront with its 1996 APA
amendments.116 One distinction, however, exists between the 1999
reforms and those adopted in previous years. The 1999 refonns
were produced with little or no input from or deliberation among
serious administrative law reformers, including agency lawyers.
The 1999 Florida APA amendments continue Florida's
renegade approach to administrative procedure refonn among the
states. The refonn bill that was signed into law as the 1999 APA
amendments is much improved over the original bill introduced in
the Florida Legislature. Yet the refonns adopted in the 1999 APA
amendments-as well as some refonns considered by the Legislature
but not adopted-are remarkable in their departure from long
standing principles of administrative procedure and thus are worthy

1 14

See Stephen T. Maher, How the Glitch Stole Christmas: 1he 1997
Amendments to the Florida Administrative Procedure Act, 25 FLA. ST. U. L. REV.
235 (1998).
115
See 1999 Fla. Laws, ch. 99-379, signed by Governor Jeb Bush, June 18,
1999. The amendments were based on HB 107, prefiled by Representative Ken
Pruitt.
116 Cf. Rossi, supra note 3, at 360-61 (predicting that judicial review of agency
rulemaking authority will become an issue in interpreting Florida's new statutory
nondelegation provision).
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of some discussion, particularly because they may resurface in
Florida and other states experimenting with statutory nondelegation.
The APA reform bill considered by the Florida Legislature in

1999 proposed four major changes to Florida's APA, although the
adopted amendments made only two of these changes. First, the
APA amendments react to

ConsolidaJed-Tomoka,

effectively

overruling the court' s test and again expressing the Legislature' s
preference fo r specific powers and duties i n statutes a s the
authorization for agency rules. 117 Second, the original bill (but not
the adopted version) proposed to overrule Consolidated-Tomoko! s
interpretation that, in challenges to proposed rules, challenging
parties bear the burden of going forward with evidence supporting
the invalidity of a rule. 118 Third, the bill (as amended in committee)
stated that judges hearing appeals of agency rules shall not defer, or
otherwise give any special weight, to an agency' s interpretation of
law; this provision, however, was deleted from the .bill late in the
legislative process and was not signed into law . 119 Fourth, the
adopted APA amendments change Florida's adjudication process by
heightening the burden when agencies reject or modify AlJ
0
conclusions of law. 12

Consolidated-Tomoko. attempted to strike a balance between the
11

requirement that an agency have "particular powers and duties in
a statute prior to promulgating a rule, 121 on the one hand, and its
conflicting

command

that

agencies

presumptively

pursue

rulemaking, 122 on the other. The 1999 APA amendments revise this

balance against agency rulemaking authority, suggesting a continued

1 17

See amendment to FLA STAT. §§ 120.52(8), 120.536, CSIHB 107, 179th
Leg. , 1999 Fla. Laws ch. 99-37.
118
See proposed amendment to FIA STAT. § 120.56, HB 107, 179th Leg. (Fla.
1999) (prefiled bill).
119
See proposed amendment to FLA STAT. § 120.68, HB 107cl, 179th Leg.
(Fla. 1999) (first version approved by the House of Representatives Committee on
Governmental Rules and Regulation).
120
See amendment to FIA STAT. § 120.57, CSIHB 107, 179th Leg. , 1999 Fla.
Laws. Ch. 99-379.
121
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 120.536(1) (West Supp. 1999) (amended 1999).
122
Id. § 120.54(1)(a)(l).
.

.

.

.
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legislative endorsement of the counter-revolution against agency
rulemaking.
In interpreting "particular powers and duties, " the
Consolidated-Tomoko. court held that " [a] rule is a valid exercise of
delegated legislative authority if it regulates a matter directly within
the class of powers and duties identified in the statute to be
implemented. " 123 The 1999 amendments reject this test by revising
the APA standard. In the end, the Legislature appears only to
substitute the word "specific" for "particular" in Florida's statutory
nondelegation standard and to preclude courts from using the
Consolidated-Tomoko. test to interpret the new standard, 124 although
the Legislature has also required agencies to rereview all of their
existing rules for compliance with the 1999 statutory nondelegation
standard.
The 1999 amendment, as signed into law, states that agencies
may only adopt rules that "implement, interpret, or make specific
the particular powers and duties granted by the enabling statute. " 125
In addition, the 1999 amendment states that "[s]tatutory language
granting rulemaking authority . . . shall be construed to extend no
further [than implementing or interpreting the specific] powers and
duties conferred by the same statute. " 126 In adopting this new
standard, the Legislature expressed a preference for the test rejected
by the appellate panel in Consolidated-Tomoko.. Although the bill
states "it is not the intent of the Legislature to reverse the result of
any specific judicial decision, " 127 the 1999 amendments purport to
preclude courts and AI.Js from applying the Consolidated-Tomoka
test in future cases. For example, addressing the language of the test
endorsed by the panel in Consolidated-Tomoka, the 1999
amendment states: "No agency shall have the authority to adopt a

123 St. Johns River Water Management Dist. v. Consolidated-Tomoka Land
Co., 717 So. 2d 72, 80 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
124 Although earlier versions of the bill used the word "detailed, " the word
"specific" was substituted later in the legislative process.
125 Amendment to §§ 120.52(8), 120.536(1), CS/HB 107, 179th Leg., 1999
Fla. Laws Ch. 99-379.
126 Id.
i21
Id.
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rule only because it . . . is within the agency' s class of powers and
duties. "

128

As with the 1996 statutory nondelegation standard, this new
standard applies not only to new rules but also to existing rules. As
agencies were required to evaluate all rules following the 1996
amendments, they are again required to evaluate all rules for
compliance with the 1999 standard. Effectively, the Legislature has
told agencies that it is not satisfied with their evaluation of whether
rules are based in "particular" powers and duties, even though
agencies evaluated their rules for compliance with this standard well
before the Consolidated-Tomoka decision was issued. 129 Agencies
now must reevaluate all rules to determine whether they are based
in " specific" statutory powers and duties. As with the 1996
amendment, the Legislature has established a timetable. Each
agency is required to provide the Joint Administrative Procedures
Committee a list of rules exceeding statutory authority under the
" specific" powers and duties standard, and the Legislature will
again consider whether rule authorization bills are necessary to
sustain the rules. 130 As of July 1 , 1999, existing rules are subject to
challenge under the new standard. 13 1
As was also the case with the 1996 APA amendments,
however, agencies have no meaningful guidance as to what the
amended statutory nondelegation standard means and how courts
will apply it. Following the 1999 amendments, courts will have to
come up with a new definition of " specific, " presumably one that

is not as broad as Consolidated-Tomoka' s definition of "particular. "
As the Consolidated-Tomoka and Calder duo illustrate, defining
" specific" will not occur without litigation, both before AI.Js and

12s

Id.
Consolidated-Tomoka was issued in Summer 1998, while the 1996 amended
APA required agencies to evaluate their existing rules for compliance with the
statutory nondelegation standard by October l , 1997. See FLA . STAT. ANN.
§ 120.536(2) (amended 1999).
130 See amendment to § 120.536(2), CS/HB 107, 179th Leg., Fla. Laws Ch.
99-379.
131
See id. If an agency, however, has failed to include a rule on the list of rules
it submits to the legislature, the rule may be subject to immediate challenge. See id.
§ 120.536(3).
129
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courts.

As

with

the

constitutional

[Vol. 8
nondelegation

doctrine, 132 the development of a determinate standard will likely

prove an impossible task for AL.Ts or appellate courts. Thus, the
Florida Legislature' s continued tinkering of the language of its
statutory nondelegation standard should suggest that the task of
defining the scope of agency rulemaking authority by general
language

in

statutes

is

a

questionable

effort at enhancing

accountability, although members of the Legislature have been
quick to claim credit for reining in bureaucracy. 133
A second change proposed in the introduced version of the

1 999

APA

reform

bill

would

have

overruled

Consolidated-Tomoka's interpretation of the 1996 amendment that
removes the presumption of validity that attaches to proposed rules
and requires agencies to prove the validity of proposed rules in rule
challenge proceedings.

Consolidated-Tomoka interpreted this

amendment to require that, although the agency has the ultimate
burden of establishing the validity of proposed rules, the challenger
has the burden of going forward with evidence supporting the
objections. The introduced 1999 reform bill would have modified
this standard in proposed rule challenge proceedings by requiring
the agency to bear "the burden of going forward and the burden to
prove by a preponderance of the evidence" that a rule is not an
invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority. 134
The impact of such a change on agencies would be enormous.
As the court noted in rejecting such an interpretation of the existing

statutory language in Consolidated-Tomoka:
[I]t would be impractical to impose such a requirement. As
the administrative law judge [below] explained, a petition
challenging a proposed rule might include numerous

1 32 See supra note 81.
1 33 See Julie Hausennan, New Law Will Ease State Rules Battles, ST.
PETERSBURG TIMEs, June 18, 1999, at 1B (noting that business lobbyists and

members of the state legislature, including Representative Pruitt, the key sponsor of
the bill, "applauded Bush's action [of signing the 1999 APA amendments into law]
as a way to rein in the power of Tallahassee bureaucrats").
1 34 Proposed amendment to FLA. STAT. § 120.56, HB 107, 179th Leg. (Fla.
1999) (prefiled bill).
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objections, not all of which remain in controversy [at] the
time of the hearing. If the agency had the burden of going
forward with the evidence, it would be forced to rebut
every objection made in the petition, if for no other reason

than to avoid the possibility of an award of attorneys' fees
for its failure to justify the proposed rule.135
Fortunately, the APA amendments that were signed into law
dropped this provision and clarified that the person challenging an
agency's rule bas the burden of going forward.136 The 1999
amended APA retains the agency's burden of proof in rule
challenge proceedings and clarifies that an agency must bear a
"preponderance of the evidence" burden of proof.137
A third major proposed change that was added to the 1999 APA
reform bill during the legislative process is modification of the
longstanding principle that courts may defer or give some weight to
agency interpretations of law. A committee amendment to the 1999
APA reform bill would have prohibited courts from deferring or
giving any weight to agency interpretations of law in rule challenge
proceedings, as courts give agency interpretations under current
case law in the federal system, in Florida, and in many states.138

This amendment stated that "judges hearing appeals of agency rules
shall not defer, or otherwise give any special weight, to an agency's .
interpretation of law or a rule. "139
The adopted 1999 APA amendments did not contain this

proposed amendment, because of a late modification to the bill.140
135

Comsolidated-Tomoka, 717 So. 2d at 76-77.
See H.B. 107, 179th Leg. (Fla. 1999) (amending FLA STAT. ANN. § 120.56
(West 1999)).
137 See id.
138
See supra notes 89-94 and accompanying text.
139
See proposed amendment to FLA STAT. § 120.68, HB 107cl , 179th Leg.
(Fla. 1999) (first version approved by the House of Representatives Committee on
Governmental Rules and Regulation); see also House of Representatives Committee
on Governmental Rules and Regulations Analysis, Report on HB 107 at 1 1 (Jan. 19,
1999) (adopting amendment).
14° Compare proposed amendment to FLA STAT. § 120.68, HB 107cl, 179th
Leg. (Fla. 1999) (first version approved by the House of Representatives Committee
on Governmental Rules & Regulations) with CSIHB 107, 179th Leg. 1999 Fla.
Laws Ch. 99-379 (making no amendment to § 120.68).
136

.

.

.
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The proposed amendment, introduced in part because of the
statutory interpretation issue raised by statutory nondegelation,
stood to greatly enhance the role of courts in reviewing of agency
rulemaking, at the cost of political accountability and expertise,
neither of which reviewing courts possess. Thus, it is fortunate that
the final bill signed into law did not include this provision.
Nevertheless, a fourth major modification, which survives in
the adopted APA amendment bill, modifies agency authority to
make legal interpretations in adjudication, tilting the balance toward
ALl or judicial legal interpretations and away from statutory
interpretations by agencies. In what is certainly the most sweeping
change in years to adjudication under Florida's APA, the 1999
amended APA prohibits agencies from rejecting or modifying AI.J
conclusions of law without overcoming a heightened burden. Under
the version of Florida' s APA that preceded the 1999 amendments,
agencies had the discretion to reject or modify ALT conclusions of
law or policy, but were bound to ALT findings of fact if supported
by competent substantial evidence. 141 The 1981 MS.APA, 142 also
provides agencies similar discretion to disagree with the finder of
fact on issues of law and policy. 143
The 1999 Florida APA amendments require an agency
rejecting ALT conclusions of law or interpretation of regulations to
11
stateO with particularity its reasons 11 and to 11 make a finding that
its substituted conclusion of law or interpretation of an
administrative rule is as or more reasonable than that which was
1 4 1 Prior to the 1999 APA amendments, Section 120.57(10) stated:
The agency in its final order may reject or modify the conclusions of law
and interpretation of administrative rules [over which it has substantive
jurisdiction]. The agency may not reject or modify the findings of fact
unless the agency first determines from a review of the entire record, and
states with particularity in the order, that the findings of fact were not
based upon competent substantial evidence.
1 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 120.57(l)(l) (West Supp. 1999) (amended 1999); see also
Harloff v. City of Sarasota, 575 So. 2d 1324, 1327 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1991)
(noting there is no statutory requirement "that an agency state with particularity its
reasons for rejecting conclusions of law that do not involve a penalty").
142 MODEL STA1E ADMIN. PROCEDURE ACT, § 4-215 (1981), 15 U.L.A. 90-91
(1990).
1 43 Pennsylvania's APA appears to provide the agency similar authority.
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rejected or modified. "144 This new provision restricts an agency' s
discretion to reject an ALT ' s interpretation of a statute o r a rule,
placing agencies in a posture of justifying their departure from ALT
order. It also introduces an uncertainty: A court might rubber stamp
an agency finding that its own legal interpretation is reasonable, but
it is likely that the Legislature intended this provision to allow a
court more sweeping authority to second guess agency
interpretations of law. In this sense, the 1999 amendments risk
expanding the authority of AL.Ts and courts to decide statutory
interpretation and policy issues in adjudication as well as
rulemaking. Yet neither AL.Ts nor appellate courts have the degree
of expertise and political accountability that agency heads do.
Perhaps of less significance, the 1999 amendments also clarify
the APA's definition of an "agency" 145 and prohibit agencies from
adopting "retroactive" rules, including rules that are intended to
clarify existing law . 146 On the whole, the adopted 1999 APA
amendments are far superior to those initially proposed in the
Legislature

and approved by

committees

early during the

consideration of the bill. Nevertheless, the 1999 Florida APA
amendments continue to endorse a statutory nondelegation doctrine;
subject existing agency rules to legal challenges that pmport to be
more restrictive of agency authority to promulgate rules than the

1996 amendments; and require agencies to go through a costly
review process that is indistinguishable from what they underwent

144 FLA STAT. § 120.57(1)(1), CS/HB 107, 179th Leg. 1999 Fla. Ch. 99-379
(amended 1999). In contrast, the prefiled bill would have allowed an agency to
modify an All' s conclusion of law only if it is "clearly erroneous, " but later
versions of the bill removed this standard of review. Compare id. , with proposed
.

amendment to FLA STAT. § 120.57(1)(1), CS/HB 107, 179th Leg. (Fla. 1999)
(prefiled bill).
145 See amendment to FLA STAT. § 120.52(1), CS/HB 107, 179th Leg. 1999
Fla. Ch. 99-379.
146 &e amendment to FLA.. STAT. § 120.54(l)(f), CS/HB 107, 179th Leg. 1999
Fla. Ch. 99-379. The amendment did not define retroactive, nor did it explain how
this new provision interacts with other provisions of section 120.54, which allow
agencies to apply rules to clarify existing laws so long as they have initiated
rulemaking in good faith. The provision was intended to preclude future application
of the court's holding in Environmental Trust v. Department of Environmental.
Protection, 714 So. 2d 493, 500-01 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
.

.
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following the 1996 APA amendments. Yet, the amendments provide
little guidance to agencies, merely substituting the word "specific"
for "particular" in Florida' s statutory nondelegation provision. The
amendments also further tilt the balance in statutory interpretation
away from agencies and toward ALJs and courts. Thus, whatever
credit the Legishlture may claim for Florida's 1999 APA
amendments, on the whole, they do not enhance the accountability
of agency decisionmaking.
For this reason, as well as the anticipated effects of the
amendments on health and environmental regulation, many in the
state urged Governor Bush to veto the 1999 APA reform bill.
Environmental groups, in particular, were strongly opposed to the
changes and Governor Bush's appointed Secretary of the
Department of Environmental Protection urged a veto of the bill. 147
The bill, however, had strong support from the Legislature.
Moreover, the Governor's General Counsel, having met with
industry lobbyists who supported passage of the bill, 148 had a
comfort level with the content of the bill, even though the 1999
APA amendments significantly reduce the power of executive
branch agencies vis-a-vis the Legislature, courts, and ALJs. Despite
many recommendations that he veto the 1999 APA amendments,
Governor Bush signed them into law on June 17, 1999.

147 See Julie Hausemum, DEP Chief Warns Against Rules Bill, ST. PEl'EsBURG
T.IMES, June 17, 1999, at 1B (reporting that Department of Environmental Protection

Secretary David Struhs urged the Governor to veto the bill because it " 'tips the
balance too far' toward the Legislature, and would make government 'less efficient
and potentially less effective' "). As Hausennan, supra note 133, reports, the
Secretary of the Department of Environmental Regulation disavowed his position
against the bill when it became clear that Bush would sign it.
148 See Shirish Date, Bush Down to Wire on Controversial Bill, PALM BEACH
POST, June 17, 1999, at 13A (noting that Bush assistant general counsel Frank
Jimenez held a meeting and signed off on a compromise acceptable to two lobbyists
for industry and developers, but that no one invited lobbyists for environmental
groups who had been following the bill all year).
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V. CONCLUSION:
WHAT LESSONS CAN REFORMERS IN OTHER STATES LEARN
FROM FLORIDA'S RECENT APA REFORM ExPERIENCES?
In its judicial adoption of statutory nondelegation, Pennsylvania

preceded

Florida

in

endorsing

this

questionable

idea

in

administrative procedure. The modest limitations Pennsylvania
courts have imposed on agencies, however, can hardly compare to
what Florida did when it endorsed statutory nondelegation, in a
form similar to the Bumpers Amendment, in its APA. The addition
of a rigid statutory nondelegation restriction to Florida's APA was
part of a larger effort to reduce agency rulemaking powers. This
also included additional cost-benefit requirements and increased
opportunities for rule challenges, as well as attorneys' fees for
successful challenges to rules. 149 Measured by the goal of reducing
agency rulemaking powers, Florida' s 1996 APA reforms were a
success. Agencies in Florida simply do not have the same power to
regulate that they once bad. Moreover, because of dissatisfaction
with the implementation of many of Florida' s 1996 amendments, in

1999, the Legislature passed additional APA amendments, taking
still more authority away from agencies.
Given, however, that the destruction of the ends of regulation
does not appear to be the goal of most state APA reformers, I
would like to suggest more practical lessons from Florida's recent
APA reforms. There are five main lessons to be taken from
Florida' s experience with law reform related to its APA-imposed
statutory nondelegation requirement.
First, because of inte:rpretive ambiguities, imposing generic
restrictions on agency regulatory authority is not likely to be
effective means for enhancing accountability, even where a system
of governance has developed a clear understanding of who should
interpret statutory authority in the administrative context. In many
states, statutory inte:rpretation is complicated because of the
presence of a central panel of AI..Js or because of reduced political
accountability of agencies due to a plural executive branch. In

149 For description of these reforms, see Rossi, supra note 3, at 362-67.
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Florida, something similar to Chevron deference has been endorsed
de jure, but given our institutional setup there is a de facto
reluctance to apply it across the board. Statutory nondelegation adds
uncertainty about who should interpret statutory authority, as well
as

uncertainty about how courts and Al.Js will apply our restrictions

on agency rulemaking. In fact, recent developments in Florida
enhance the authority of ALls to interpret agency statutes, a result
that runs counter to the goals of enhanced agency expertise and
political accountability promoted by deference to the agency. Much
more certainty and legitimacy could be achieved if the application

of statutory nondelegation standards were limited to the legislature
or legislative oversight committees, such as Pennsylvania' s IRRC .

I am not sure how successful the judicially-imposed statutory
nondelegation requirement has been in Pennsylvania, but there may

be some sound reasons for abandoning it in your APA reforms, or
limiting its enforcement to a legislative committee.
A second lesson is that extreme measures to reduce agency
authority

are

not always successful. Rather than limiting agency

authority to promulgate rules across the board, it may have been
more effective for Florida to examine notice requirements or to
require an elaboration of means for achieving regulatory ends. The

1981 MSAPA, for example, attempts to enhance the accountability
of agencies to a state's legislature by requiring specificity in agency
notice. Although problems may ensue if courts adopt strict scrutiny

in applying this provision of the ·MSAPA, 150 the 1981 MSAPA takes

a more light-handed approach to statutory nondelegation than states

like Florida or Pennsylvania. Another approach, endorsed in the
Oregon APA, is somewhere between the approach of statutory
nondelegation and the 1981 MSAPA. Oregon's APA requires an
agency to make a statement of statutory basis and need for a rule,
as well as a justification for how the proposed rule meets the
need. 151 Oregon' s approach effectively requires an agency to
make a statement of means and statutory ends, but does not require
rigorous judicial review of either the means or the ends, including

150 See supra note 49 (discussing Bonfield's rationale for provision).
151 See OR. REv . STAT. § 183.335(2)(b)(B)-(C) (1991).
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statutory

authorization

for

those

ends. 152

These

are

procedural-not substantive-requirements; but we are talking about
administrative procedure acts.
A third lesson to take from these restrictions is that many
reforms to state government-particularly those aimed at the
substance of regulation-are better made in subject-matter specific
contexts, rather than in across-the-board statutes such as an APA.
Statutory nondelegation, I have argued, may adversely affect the
accountability by allowing legislators to claim credit for regulatory
relief without taking responsibility for making a trade off between
agency discretion and limitations on agency power at a more
concrete

level.

environmental

For example,
agency

has

the

in deciding
authority

whether a
to

prohibit

state
local

development, we are likely to get a better result if the legislature
addresses this in the specific regulatory context, rather than across
the-board in an APA. APA-imposed statutory nondelegation not
only skirts legislative accountability but also leaves much for courts

to resolve. 153 If a state legislature wishes to prohibit a specific
agency from regulating an activity, so be it. The legislature,
however, should be specific in its prohibition, and should have
deliberated about its decision to foreclose specific regulatory action
by an agency in a particular regulatory context. In a sense, I am
advocating the reverse of what Florida adopted in its APA. If the
legislature wishes to prohibit otherwise constitutional regulation, let
it prohibit particular powers and duties in subject-matter specific
statutes, not invite courts, AIJs, or even legislative committees into
the political process of regulation. This is akin to the approach that
courts take in interpreting the Federal APA, although the recent
Florida experience might suggest little political hope for this
approach in some states.

152 For discussion, see Dave Frohnmayer, National Trends in Court Review of
Agency Action: Some Reflections on the Model State Administrative Procedure Act
and New Utah Administrative Procedure Act, 3 BYU J. PuB. L. 1 , 18-19 (1989).
153 For criticism of "single-statute regulatory reform" and the conflict it poses
for existing statutes and laws, see William W. Buzbee, Regu'/atory Refonn or
Statutory Muddle The "Legis'lative Mirage" of Single Statute Regu'/atory Refonn, 5
N.Y.U. ENVTL. L. REv . 298 (1996).
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Fourth, there are no easy answers to reformers' concerns about
administrative accountability. Radical quick fixes-I count among
these statutory nondelegation-are likely to lead to frustration and a
state' s revisit of APA reform in subsequent years. Since 1996
Florida has already addressed APA modifications twice, most
recently in a set of 1999 APA amendments reacting to judicial
interpretation of its 1996 statutory nondelegation provision. The
1999 amendments continue Florida's counter-revolution against
agency rulemaking, and will weaken agency discretion to make
legal interpretations and impair agency flexibility in the
implementation of regulatory programs.
A final-and the most important-lesson to take from Florida's
1 996 and 1999 APA reform experiences is the importance of
establishing and utilizing independent law reform commissions to
guide and evaluate the APA reform process. Although Florida's
Governor established an ad hoc APA Review Commission in 1996,
the Commission was short-lived. It succeeded in evaluating and
recommending many moderate reforms, including several new ideas
for the state. Its short life, however, precluded the Commission
from fully evaluating the implementation of its recommendations.
By the time the Commission finished its main task, the legislative
session had already begun, with the Commission's proposals on the
agenda. The Commission's moderate proposals opened the door for
special interest groups to use the legislative process to make their
own radical mark on administrative procedure in the state, outside
of the deliberations of or evaluation by an independent committee
process. In 1999, this approach to reform continued in the state with
little or no serious discussion of the impact of legislative proposals
outside of the Legislature itself. Several urged the Governor to veto
the 1999 APA reform bill, but the Governor's Office, which
participated in some amendments to the bill very late in the process,
was not about to reject a bill that had strong legislative support.
Unfortunately, the 1999 Florida APA amendments continue for
Florida the counter-revolution against rulemaking it endorsed in
1996. Hopefully, other states can bypass the ad hoc approach to law
reform that produced the statutory nondelegation provisions in
Florida' s 1996 and 1999 APA amendments. Utilization of an
independent law reform commission in making and evaluating
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legislative proposals, including involvement of a broad range of
agency heads in the process, might help avoid turning a state APA
into little more than a strategic tool for the clients of lawyers who
have not received what they want from agencies or courts. In
Florida, that is what the recent APA reform process seems to have
become.
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